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Preemption of State Law Claims
Involving Medical Devices:
Why Increasing Liability for
Manufacturers is a Perilous but
Pivotal Proposition
ABSTRACT
A circuit split regarding the preemptive scope of the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) has widened over the past several
years. The split encompasses both the circumstances under which the
MDA implicitly preempts state law claims and the scope of the MDA's
express preemption provision. Manufacturers of medical devices
regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) enjoyed many
years of favorable rulings on the issue of federal preemption and
deference to the primacy of FDA jurisdiction on monitoring or
enforcement actions. However, the circuit split is reshaping the
litigation landscape, and injured plaintiffs may rely on certain Circuit
Court of Appeals' cases that have ruled against federal preemption to
buttress new or existing product liability claims. Device manufacturers
are also changing their approach to tackle the large number of
impending lawsuits. This Note proposes resolving the circuit split by
condensing the scope of federal preemption and further increasing
liability for manufacturers to an unprecedented scale such that the tort
regime substantially supplements federal agency enforcement.
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Steven McCormick can no longer walk, relies on various
medications to deal with persistent and excruciating pain, and lives in
fear of developing cancer after being implanted with Infuse, a medical
device manufactured and marketed by Medtronic.1 Once a successful
engineer for Lockheed Martin, Mr. McCormick's misfortunes began
nearly seventeen years ago when he experienced lower back pain,
which slowly increased in severity until it became unbearable.
Accordingly, he consulted with Dr. Michael Rosner, one of the best
spine surgeons available.2
1. See Statement of Claim at 9, McCormick v. Rosner, No. 2013.203 (Md. Health Care
Alternative Dispute Resolution Office Apr. 23, 2013), available at
http://center.mdmalpracticeattorney.com/files/2014/02/SOC2013-203R.pdf; Brief of Appellants at
9-10, McCormick v. Medtronic, Inc., 101 A.3d 467 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 4, 2014) (No. 670),
2014 WL 2093919.
2. Michael K. Rosner, MD, FAANS, SOCIETY OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS,
http://www.societyns.org/societylbio.aspx?memberid=145292/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2014); Spines of
Service Q&A, SPINAL RESEARCH FOUND., http://www.spinerf.org/learn/ask-expert-0/spines-
service-qa (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). Patients with chronic, intractable lower back pain often face
the harsh reality that the prognosis for recovery with conservative, non-operative management
alone is not good. See Gunnar B. J. Andersson et al., Treatment of Intractable Discogenic Low
Back Pain: A Systematic Review of Spinal Fusion and Intradiscal Electrothermal Therapy
(IDET), 9 PAIN PHYSICIAN 237, 237 (2006). Consequently, such patients are confronted with a
choice between living with persistent back pain and possible narcotic dependency or electing to
consult a surgeon to potentially undergo operative management with a procedure such as spinal
fusion. See id.
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Thus, when Dr. Rosner recommended a common technique
known as spinal fusion-a surgical procedure in which one or more
vertebrae of the spine are "fused" together-Mr. McCormick had no
reason to question this approach.3 Dr. Rosner explained that he
"intended to achieve fusion by using Infuse . .. a genetically
engineered version of a naturally occurring protein that stimulates
bone growth."4 Dr. Rosner described Infuse as the "latest and best
technology" and assured Mr. McCormick that after the procedure, he
would be "fit enough to parachute out of airplanes."' What Dr. Rosner
never disclosed to Mr. McCormick was that he was a paid consultant
for Medtronic.6
During surgery, Dr. Rosner implanted Infuse in an "off-label"
or unapproved manner.7 Instead of getting better, Mr. McCormick's
back pain became progressively worse until he was forced to endure
additional surgeries and go on disability.8 Less than a year later,
scans confirmed the presence of two nodules in his lungs.9 Because it
is now known that Infuse may be a cancer-causing agent,0 Mr.
McCormick must undergo regular tests to monitor the nodules and
ensure that they do not become cancerous."
3. "To achieve the fusion process, surgeons implant a graft-usually bone or bone-like
material-around the vertebrae during surgery. Over the following months, a physiological
mechanism similar to that which occurs when a fractured bone heals causes the graft to join, or
'weld,' the vertebrae together." Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 5. While bone graft material
was typically harvested from another part of the patient's body, cost considerations, among other
factors, compelled medical device manufacturers to artificially produce bone material for use in
the procedure. Id. This produced bone-morphogenetic proteins (BMPs), which effectively
promoted bone creation and remodeling and could thus serve as bone graft substitutes. See
generally Erika H. J. Groeneveld & Elisabeth H. Burger, Bone Morphogenetic Proteins in Human
Bone Regeneration, 142 EUR. J. ENDROCRINOLOGY 9 (2000).
4. Infuse is a recombinant BMP, which, in 2002, became the first BMP approved for
clinical use in spinal fusion procedures. See Kevin S. Cahill et al., Prevalence, Complications, and
Hospital Charges Associated with Use of Bone-Morphogenetic Proteins in Spinal Fusion
Procedures, 302 JAMA 58, 58 (2009). Infuse consists of three components: an absorbable collagen
sponge scaffold, a titanium threaded fusion cage, and rhBMP-2. Coleman v. Medtronic, Inc., 167
Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). "During surgery, the doctor infuses the collagen
sponge with liquid rhBMP-2 and inserts the sponge into the cage to both stabilize the spine and
maintain spacing between the vertebrae during the fusion process." Id.
5. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 9. BMP use in spinal fusion procedures has
increased exponentially since its introduction. Cahill et al., supra note 4, at 60. In the first year
of clinical approval, BMP was used in less than 1 percent of all fusions. Id. Less than four years
later, this had increased to nearly a quarter of all fusions. Id.
6. See Statement of Claim, supra note 1, at 7.
7. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 9.
8. Id. at 9-10.
9. Id. at 10.
10. See, e.g., Nancy E. Epstein, Basic Science and Spine Literature Document Bone
Morphogenetic Protein Increases Cancer Risk, 5 SURGICAL NEUROLOGY INT'L. 552, 552 (2014).
11. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 10.
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Mr. McCormick sued Dr. Rosner and Medtronic in Maryland
state court to obtain compensation for his suffering.12 Unfortunately,
the circuit court dismissed all of Mr. McCormick's claims with
prejudice and held that they were preempted by federal law.13
However, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed the lower
court's ruling, holding that federal law does not preempt the claims
and that Mr. McCormick should be allowed the opportunity to replead
fraud with particularity.14 Final resolution of the case is still pending,
but like Steven McCormick, many patients continue to suffer both new
and enduring complications from the use of Infuse.15
Generally, medical device manufacturers such as Medtronic
are subject to an assortment of federal regulations pursuant to the
Medical Device Amendments (MDA), which modified the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).1 6 Because Congress granted enforcement
authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), civil plaintiffs
are preempted from seeking to impose liability on device
manufacturers in state court solely for violations of the FDCA. 1"
However, whether state law claims that include allegations of
FDCA violations can survive preemption-both express and
implied-remains an open question. Previous rulings by the Supreme
Court have outlined an extremely narrow "gap" through which state
law claims can escape preemption,8 but recent Circuit Court of
Appeals' cases have created a circuit split that denies individuals like
Steven McCormick basic justice for their suffering.
Part I of this Note will outline the MDA's classification of
medical devices, the potentially laborious device approval process, and
the Supreme Court cases that form the manufacturer-friendly
foundation for federal preemption of state law claims. Part II will
critique the different circuits' approaches to implied and express
preemption. Part III will propose a resolution of the circuit split by
expanding the extent of state law claims that can escape express and
implied preemption. Immunizing medical device manufacturers from
12. See McCormick v. Medtronic, Inc., 101 A.3d 467, 476-77 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014).
13. Id. at 477.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Jane Mundy, Medtronic Infuse Bone Graft Leaves Young Father
Disabled, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM (Oct. 31, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/medtronic-infuse-bone-graftlinterview-
medtronic-lawsuit-bone-graft- 14-20215.html.
16. 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2012).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 335b(b)(1)(a) (2012) (describing the authority of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to enforce civil penalties for FDCA violations).
18. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
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state law tort claims is economically inefficient. Rather, state law
liability can complement federal agency enforcement.
I. PREEMPTION OF STATE CLAIMS INVOLVING PMA-APPROVED MEDICAL
DEVICES
A. Classes of Medical Devices Under the MDA
Regulatory approval of the riskiest class of medical devices by
the FDA typically involves a laborious premarket approval (PMA)
process, but some manufacturers manage to escape via a less
stringent 510(k) process. The FDA regulates medical devices
pursuant to the FDCA,1 9 which was modified by the MDA in 1976.20
The MDA gave the FDA "new broad powers to regulate medical
devices,"2 1 and the statute divided devices into three classes. Class I
devices present little or no risk to human health and safety and are
subject to general controls such as manufacturing and labeling
requirements.22 Class II devices pose a slightly greater risk to human
safety and are subject to general controls as well as special controls
such as performance standards, post-market surveillance, and patient
registries.23
A Class III device cannot provide a reasonable assurance of
safety and effectiveness under Class I or II controls and is marketed
as either a life-supporting device or one that causes an unreasonable
risk of illness or injury.24 As a result, a Class III device is subject to
the rigorous PMA process.2 5  However, some devices can obtain
marketing clearance through a significantly less stringent 510(k)
review process, which does not require any independent clinical
19. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2012).
20. Medical Device Amendments, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360-381 (2012).
21. Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1319 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 815
(1995).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2012); Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA
for Marketing, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 4, 2014) [hereinafter FDA Marketing,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Consumers/ucml42523.htm ("[Class I]
devices present minimal potential for harm to the user and are often simpler in design than
Class II or Class III devices. Examples include enema kits and elastic bandages. 47% of medical
devices fall under this category and 95% of these are exempt from the regulatory process.").
23. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2012); FDA Marketing, supra note 22 ("Most medical
devices are considered Class II devices. Examples of Class II devices include powered
wheelchairs and some pregnancy test kits. 43% of medical devices fall under this category.").
24. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2012); FDA Marketing, supra note 22 ("[Class III] devices
usually sustain or support life, are implanted, or present potential unreasonable risk of illness or
injury. Examples of Class III devices include implantable pacemakers and breast implants. 10%
of medical devices fall under this category.").
25. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2012).
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testing if the device manufacturer can demonstrate that its product is
"substantially equivalent" to an approved product-also known as a
predicate device-already on the market.26
If a device does not qualify for clearance under the 510(k)
process, the device must meet an extensive list of current good
manufacturing practice (CGMP) requirements.27 These requirements
set forth a general quality system to ensure the safety and
effectiveness of medical devices.28 In addition, Class III devices may
be subject to post-market requirements and regulations regarding
labeling,29 tracking,30 post-market surveillance,31 and traceability.32
26. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(o)(1)(A) (2012); 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.81, 807.87 (2015). The 510(k)
clearance process has been repeatedly criticized as an ineffective means of establishing the
safety and effectiveness of new devices. See Benjamin A. Goldberger, The Evolution of
Substantial Equivalence in FDA's Premarket Review of Medical Devices, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
317, 331 (2001) ("Justice Stevens reasoned [in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 493-94
(1996)] that even though FDA may examine a 510(k) with an eye toward safety and
effectiveness, a finding of substantial equivalence is not a statement by FDA about the safety of
a device. It is permission simply to market the device without going through the PMA process.");
Michael Van Buren, Note, Closing the Loopholes in the Regulation of Medical Devices: The Need
for Congress to Reevaluate Medical Device Regulation, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 441, 460 (2007) ("[T]he
relative speed of the 510(k) process, as compared to the PMA, increases the likelihood of
defective products reaching the market . . . . [Congress] should merely modify the 510(k) process
and post-market processes as a means of ensuring greater device safety."); INST. OF MED.,
MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS
193 (July 2011) ("The 510(k) clearance process is not intended to evaluate the safety and
effectiveness of medical devices . . . . The 510(k) process cannot be transformed into a pre-market
evaluation of safety and effectiveness as long as the standard for clearance is substantial
equivalence . . . ."). But see Jeffrey K. Shapiro, Substantial Equivalence Premarket Review: The
Right Approach for Most Medical Devices, 69 Food & Drug L.J. 365, 393-94 (2014) ("Courts and
commentators since Lohr (including the Supreme Court itself) have erred in uncritically
extrapolating Lohr to the present day . . . . (T~he 510(k) process has all or almost all of the
attributes that the IOM [Institute of Medicine] Committee suggests should be incorporated in a
premarket review system for moderate risk devices.").
27. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f) (2012); 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1-820.250 (2015).
28. 21 C.F.R. § 820.1 (2015). Specifically, the FDA requires device manufacturers to
adopt procedures and controls regarding (1) design control; (2) quality assurance programs; (3)
adequate written cleaning procedures and schedules to meet manufacturing process
specifications; (4) written manufacturing specifications and processing procedures; (5) process
validation; (6) written procedures for finished device inspection to assure that device
specifications have been met; and (7) corrective and preventive action. Id.; see 21 C.F.R. §
820.184 (2015).
29. 21 C.F.R. § 814.80 (2015).
30. 21 C.F.R. § 821.1 (2015).
31. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 803.50(a), 822 (2015) (requiring manufacturers to report
any post-approval information that reasonably suggests that the device (1) "[m]ay have caused or
contributed to a death or serious injury" or (2) "[has malfunctioned" and that any recurring
malfunction "would be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury").
32. Id.; see also § 820.65 (2015). The FDA is undertaking a new post-market device
surveillance plan that involves labeling every implantable device with a standardized, traceable
code, which will allow regulators and researchers to better track implants' performance and note
any safety issues that arise. See Josh Rising & Ben Moscovitch, The Food and Drug
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As a result, the PMA process is laborious for device
manufacturers. It requires a multi-volume application including
reports of all studies and investigations of the device's safety and
effectiveness previously published or that should reasonably be
known.33 In addition, the FDA may refer it to a panel of outside
experts,34 and may request additional data from the manufacturer,3 5
before deciding whether to approve the application. Hence, it should
come as no surprise that most device approval applications are filed
under the significantly "weaker" 510(k) process, which raises concerns
about the specifics underlying device approvals and the scope of
device-related liability under state and federal law.
B. Implied Preemption of State Law Claims Under Buckman
The Supreme Court has ruled that the MDA implicitly
preempts certain state law claims, and that a presumption against
preemption only applies in certain scenarios. The Supremacy Clause
of the US Constitution36 invalidates state laws that conflict with
federal statutes and regulations.37 The debate over whether courts
should adopt a presumption for or against preemption3 8 remains
unresolved in the medical device context, but the Supreme Court has
made certain pronouncements that shed light on the issue. Three
cases in particular outline whether and when state law claims
involving medical devices are federally preempted.39
In 2001, the Supreme Court held that the MDA implicitly
preempted a state law fraud-against-the-FDA claim based on FDA
rules about product approval.40 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal
Administration's Unique Device Identification System: Better Postmarket Data on the Safety and
Effectiveness of Medical Devices, 174 JAMA INTERN. MED. 1719, 1719 (Sept. 29, 2014).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1) (2012).
34. 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(a) (2015).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(H).
36. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 ("[Tlhe Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land . . . .").
37. See Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985).
38. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580 (2011) ("[T]he Supremacy Clause
therefore suggests that federal law should be understood to impliedly repeal conflicting state
law. Further, the provision suggests that courts should not strain to find ways to reconcile
federal law with seemingly conflicting state law."). But see id. at 2591 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
("For more than half a century, we have directed courts to presume that congressional action
does not supersede 'the historic police powers of the States . . . unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."') (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("[W]e have long presumed that
Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.").
39. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 312 (2008); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 341 (2001); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 470.
40. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348.
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Committee involved plaintiffs claiming injuries from the use of
orthopedic bone screws.41 The plaintiffs sued Buckman Company, a
consulting company that had assisted the screws' manufacturer in
bypassing the difficult PMA process for Class III medical devices and
receiving 510(k) clearance.42 The plaintiffs argued that Buckman
made fraudulent representations to the FDA regarding the screws'
intended use in order to receive this clearance, and asserted state tort
claims characterized as fraud-on-the-FDA claims.4 3
The Court assumed that a presumption against preemption
existed, but only in situations where the historic primacy of states in
regulating matters of health and safety might raise federalism
concerns.44 Here, the Court did not believe fraud against federal
agencies qualified as "a field which the States have traditionally
occupied."45  Instead, the situation before the Court involved an
inherently federal relationship, and thus, the presumption against
preemption did not apply.4 6  Accordingly, the plaintiffs' claims
conflicted with federal law-due to the federal statutory scheme
empowering the FDA to deter and punish fraud against the
agency47-and were implicitly preempted.48
The Court in Buckman focused on the importance of entrusting
the FDA with exclusive authority to approve and enforce medical
device regulations.49 However, there remained the unaddressed fact
that none of the agency's enforcement mechanisms includes a private
right of action that would allow injured plaintiffs to be adequately
compensated for injuries resulting from manufacturer
non-compliance.5 0 This is one of the underlying reasons why plaintiffs
may seek redress under state law.
41. Id. at 343.
42. Id. at 346.
43. Id. at 346-47.
44. Id. at 348 (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485).
45. Id. at 347.
46. Id. at 347-48.
47. See id. at 350 (explaining that (1) allowing state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims would
conflict with the FDA's responsibility to monitor fraud, and (2) medical device manufacturers
would face dramatically increased burdens-burdens not contemplated by Congress in enacting
the FDCA and the MDA-if forced to comply with the FDA's detailed regime in the shadow of
fifty state tort regimes).
48. Id. at 348. Because the Court found implied preemption, it did not express a view
regarding whether the claims would also be subject to express preemption under the MDA's
explicit preemption clause. See id. n.2.
49. See id. at 349-50.
50. Marcia Boumil, FDA Approval of Drugs and Devices: Preemption of State Laws for
"Parallel" Tort Claims, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, 31 (2015).
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C. Express Preemption of State Law Claims Under Riegel and Lohr
After Buckman, it would take the Supreme Court seven years
to address the MDA's preemption clause and rule that it expressly
bars state law claims involving devices approved under the
exhaustive, multi-step PMA process.5' In particular, the MDA
expressly preempts any state law requirement that adds to, or is
different from, a safety or effectiveness requirement established under
the MDA.5 2
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., plaintiffs sued Medtronic after a
PMA-approved Class III cardiac catheter in the lead plaintiffs
coronary artery ruptured and required emergency surgery.53 The
Court held that the MDA established a rigorous federal regulatory
process for ensuring the safety of medical devices,54 and the plain
language of the MDA's preemption clause explicitly provided that no
state may set requirements that differ from or add to the federal
ones.55
Riegel differentiated and limited the earlier holding of
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,56 in which preemption was not found for
claims arising from alleged defects in a heart pacemaker lead cleared
via the 510(k) "substantially equivalent" process.57  Applying a
presumption against preemption, the Court in Lohr held that the
plaintiffs claims were not expressly preempted because the FDA had
merely determined equivalency to a predicate device, rather than
making a sufficient determination of safety and effectiveness.5 8 In
making this distinction, the Court strongly distinguished the
"rigorous" PMA process from the "limited" nature of 510(k) review.59
51. See supra Part L.A (explaining the details and steps of the PMA process).
52. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012). An implementing regulation clarifies that state or local
requirements are preempted only when (1) the FDA has established specific counterpart
regulations, or (2) there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under
the FDCA, thereby making any existing divergent state or local requirements applicable to the
device different from, or in addition to, the specific FDA requirements. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)
(2015). The regulation also clarifies that Section 360k does not preempt state or local
requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under
the [FDCA]. Id.
53. 552 U.S. 312, 320 (2008).
54. Id. at 323.
55. See id. at 324-25 ("[It is implausible that the MDA was meant to 'grant greater
power (to set state standards "different from, or in addition to," federal standards) to a single
state jury than to state officials acting through administrative or legislative lawmaking
processes."').
56. 518 U.S. 470, 471 (1996).
57. See id.
58. Id. at 495.
59. Id. at 477-79.
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II. IMPOSING INCREASED LIABILITY ON MEDICAL DEVICE
MANUFACTURERS MAY RESOLVE THE DEEPENING CIRCUIT SPLIT
While Lohr and Riegel fell on different sides of the line between
two types of FDA review for medical devices, the Court acknowledged
in both cases that some state law claims may survive MDA
preemption. In Lohr, the Court correctly noted that "[n]othing in
§ 360k denies [the state] the right to provide a traditional damages
remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel
federal requirements."60  The Court echoed this observation in
Riegel.61
Since Riegel, various circuit courts have addressed the issue of
whether federal law preempts state law claims against medical device
manufacturers that "parallel" federal requirements. Instead of
narrowing the scope of Buckman's implied preemption and Riegel's
express preemption, a circuit split has emerged regarding the narrow
"gap" through which a plaintiffs claims can escape both implied and
express preemption. Three circuits have widened this gap, while other
circuits have adhered to defendant-friendly precedents in favoring
federal preemption or have thwarted plaintiffs by requiring them to
plead a violation of a device-specific requirement. This Note proposes
that the Supreme Court should enlarge the "no-preemption" gap to
resolve the circuit split and eliminate any uncertainty regarding
federal preemption.62
A. The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits Correctly Ruled Against
Federal Preemption and Eased Plaintiffs' Pleading Burden
The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have dramatically
changed the outlook of medical device litigation by ruling against
federal preemption.63 In one case, the plaintiff alleged a violation of a
state duty-to-warn law based on the manufacturer's failure to comply
with the FDA's Class III device reporting regulations by not reporting
the device's previous injuries and malfunctions.64 The Fifth Circuit
60. Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
61. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330 ("State requirements are pre-empted under the MDA only to
the extent that they are 'different from, or in addition to' the requirements imposed by federal
law. Thus, § 360k does not prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims
premised on a violation of FDA regulations; the state duties in such a case 'parallel,' rather than
add to, federal requirements.") (citations omitted).
62. See infra Part III.
63. See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2839 (2014); Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011); Bausch v. Stryker
Corp., 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 498 (2011).
64. See Hughes, 631 F.3d at 765-66.
[Vol. 17:4:10851094
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upheld the claim because it paralleled the federal requirements
without imposing any additional requirements.65  However,
unsubstantiated allegations of an FDA regulatory violation are
insufficient.66 A plaintiffs claims are truly "parallel" when they
identify specific FDA processes and procedures that were violated and
caused the alleged injury.67
Under this reasoning, a medical device manufacturer is
exposed to state liability whenever the manufacturer has violated
analogous federal requirements.68 This supports relaxing the
plaintiffs' evidentiary burdens at the outset of a trial. Cases against
medical device manufacturers should often progress to formal
discovery, as such discovery is "necessary" for a plaintiff "to provide a
detailed statement of the specific bases for her claim." 69
Appropriately, this rule would help plaintiffs defeat motions to
65. See id. at 771-72. In response to an argument by the defendant that only the FDA,
not juries, should be allowed to determine non-compliance with federal requirements, the court
held that neither a formal finding nor an enforcement action by the FDA was required to show a
violation of such requirements. See id. at 772-73.
66. Id. at 773. The court noted that the plaintiff's allegations here were "not conclusory"
as she "presented evidence that supports the view that [the defendant] violated the plain text of
the [medical device reporting] regulations." Id. Compare id., with Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631
F.3d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that injuries resulting from impurities in the
manufacturing process could lead to a parallel claim; however, the complaint in question was
"impermissibly conclusory and vague" as it did "not specify the manufacturing defect [or] a
causal connection between the failure of the specific manufacturing process and the specific
defect in the process that caused the personal injury, nor d[id] the complaint tell [the court] how
the manufacturing process failed, or how it deviated from the FDA approved manufacturing
process").
67. See Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 510 (5th Cir. 2012) ("In support of the
allegations ... ,[the plaintiff] pleaded that [the defendant] initiated a recall on its [product], and
that the recall 'included Plaintiff's specific hip device.' [The plaintiff] also alleged that the FDA
sent a warning letter to [the defendant] five months before his surgery, which included a notice
that [the defendant] failed to verify and implement changes .... .").
68. See id. at 510, 516 ("Under Funk and Hughes, [the plaintiff] has sufficiently pleaded
parallel claims . . . to the extent that the claims are based upon manufacturing defects resulting
from violations of federal regulations . . . The Court [in Riegel] explicitly stated that § 360k does
not prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA
regulations; the state duties in such a case 'parallel,' rather than add to, federal requirements.");
Hughes, 631 F.3d at 767 ("Riegel and Lohr ... make clear that a manufacturer is not protected
from state tort liability when the claim is based on the manufacturer's violation of applicable
federal requirements."); Bausch, 630 F.3d at 558 (concluding that the plaintiff's state law claims
were neither expressly nor implicitly preempted as "federal law does not preempt parallel claims
under state law based on a medical device manufacturer's violation of federal law").
69. Bausch, 630 F.3d at 558; see also id. at 554 ("[P]laintiffs [cannot] be expected to
plead their claims with greater specificity without discovery to obtain access to confidential
government and company documents.") (citing In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods.
Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1209-14 (8th Cir. 2010) (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)).
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dismiss based on federal preemption, which have been manufacturers'
most potent weapon.70
A lower pleading standard is also supported by the fact that
federal requirements are contained in PMA agreements that are
nearly always confidential.71 This confidentiality creates a problem
for the injured plaintiff: to obtain discovery, the complaint must
contain enough factual material to state a plausible claim.72 However,
all of the relevant factual material may be confidential and thereby
out of reach.73 The problem arises from the heightened pleading
standards outlined by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly74 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,75 and it leaves injured consumers uncompensated and device
manufacturers under-deterred.7 6 In the specific case of parallel claims
against device manufacturers, these pleading standards have been
described as a "grave,"77 "astronomical,"78 "insurmountable,"79 and
"virtually impossible" burden for plaintiffs.80  In other words,
"plaintiffs need the facts to get discovery, but they need discovery to
70. See MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., REED SMITH LLP, MEDICAL DEVICE PREEMPTION-IS
THERE LIFE FOR PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AFTER RIEGEL V. MEDTRONIC, INC? (2012), available at
http://www.dri.org/DRI/course-materials/2012-DMD/pdfs/12_Brown.pdf ("Federal preemption
remains one of the most powerful defenses available to a medical device manufacturer facing a
tort lawsuit involving a product approved by the FDA's Premarket Approval (or PMA) process.").
71. Cameron T. Norris, Drugs, Devices, & Discovery: Using Fee-Shifting to Resolve the




72. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2270 (2012) ("[E]mpirical results
suggest that . . . Twombly and Iqbal have negatively affected plaintiffs in at least 15% to 21% of
cases that faced Rule 12(b)(6) motions in the post-Iqbal data window."); William M. Janssen,
Iqbal "Plausibility" in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541, 541
(2011) ("In tandem, [Twombly and Iqbal] represent the Court's resolve that speculation of
wrongdoing will not be sufficient to unlock the doors to civil litigation in federal court. Instead,
as Iqbal made firm, a plaintiff is now required to plead a claim that is factually "plausible" to
avoid dismissal.").
73. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.9 (2015).
74. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
75. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
76. Norris, supra note 71, at 2.
77. Demetria D. Frank-Jackson, The Medical Device Federal Preemption Trilogy:
Salvaging Due Process for Injured Plaintiffs, 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 454 (2011).
78. Malika Kanodia, The Fate of the Injured Patient in the Wake of Riegel v. Medtronic:
Should Congress Interject?, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 791, 827 (2009).
79. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1209
(8th Cir. 2010) (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Ashley A. Williams, Surviving Medical Device Preemption Under 21 U.S.C. 360k:
Clarifying Pleading Standards for Parallel Claims in the Wake of Twombly and Iqbal, 9 SETON
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 109, 130 (2013).
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get the facts."81  It is thus sensible for courts to relax plaintiffs'
evidentiary burdens in medical device injury cases. Otherwise,
plaintiffs may have no way of obtaining the information to prove the
elements of their claims at the pleading stage.
The Ninth Circuit recently followed this line of reasoning in an
en banc decision finding that state law failure-to-warn claims that
parallel federal requirements are not expressly or implicitly
preempted.82 In Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., a Class III medical device's
risk of causing paralysis was not known at the time of PMA approval,
but it became known to the manufacturer after approval but prior to
the plaintiffs injury.83 However, the manufacturer failed to inform
the FDA.8 4  The plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturer was
negligent under state law because it violated the federal MDA
requirements to report adverse event information to the FDA. 85 The
Ninth Circuit noted that Riegel expressly preserved claims alleging
violation of state duties that "parallel," rather than add to, federal
requirements applicable to the device.6  Specifically, a state law
duty-to-warn "contemplates a warning to a third party such as the
FDA," and this is genuinely equivalent to the analogous federal duty
under the MDA. 8 1
While the court in Stengel did not rule on the claim's merits, it
found the claim based on a state duty-to-warn law could be
distinguished from the PMA process at issue in Buckman because the
state law duty paralleled a federal law duty under the MDA, as in
Lohr.88  The court further held that the claim was not implicitly
81. Norris, supra note 71, at 11.
82. See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2839 (2014).
83. Id. at 1227.
84. Id. at 1226; see 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a) (2015) ("If you are a
manufacturer, you must report . . . information . . . that reasonably suggests that a device that
you market: (1) May have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury, or (2) Has
malfunctioned and this device or a similar device that you market would be likely to cause or
contribute to a death or serious injury, if the malfunction were to recur.").
85. See Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1226.
86. See id. at 1228 ("The rule that emerges from [Lohr, Buckman, and Riegel] is that the
MDA does not preempt a state-law claim for violating a state-law duty that parallels a federal-
law duty under the MDA.").
87. Id. at 1233. Note that there is precedent to apply a genuine equivalence standard to
determine parallelism. See, for example, McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir.
2005), in which the Seventh Circuit explained, "[i]n order for a state requirement to be parallel to
a federal requirement, and thus not expressly preempted under § 360k(a), the plaintiff must
show that the requirements are 'genuinely equivalent.' State and federal requirements are not
genuinely equivalent if a manufacturer could be held liable under the state law without having
violated the federal law."
88. See Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1234 (Watford, J., concurring) ("[T]he [plaintiffs'] negligence
claim is not expressly preempted because it seeks to hold Medtronic accountable only for failing
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preempted given the crucial function of state law in "regulating the
adequacy of post-sale warnings for products already on the market."8 9
In contrast to fraud against a federal agency, states have traditionally
regulated post-sale warnings.90 This fact triggers the presumption
against preemption and creates another plaintiff-friendly ruling.91
Not only does the Ninth Circuit's ruling move away from preemption
of parallel state law claims, it also demonstrates that the tort regime
can serve a complementary role to the FDA's regulation.
Admittedly, such rulings increase legal uncertainty for
manufacturers involved in products liability cases. A manufacturer
that complies with the FDA's requirements would justifiably feel
misled if it found itself liable under states' laws. This is one reason
why manufacturers of FDA-regulated medical devices enjoyed many
years of favorable rulings. However, the Supreme Court recently
declined to review Stengel,92 indicating at least tacit approval of the
reasoning. Thus, injured plaintiffs can rely on the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning to buttress new or existing product liability claims while
manufacturers may be forced to change their approach in tackling the
large number of potential lawsuits.
B. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits Stubbornly Cling to the Defendant-
Friendly Rulings of Buckman and Riegel
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have found preemption even for
state law claims of manufacturing defects based on a violation of a
federal duty under the MDA. 93 Both circuits have ruled that post-sale
failure-to-warn and failure-to-recall claims were expressly preempted
by Section 360k under Riegel because they imposed requirements that
were "different from" or "in addition to" federal requirements.94
to do what federal law mandated-nothing more. The state law duty, as alleged by the
[plaintiffs], is precisely parallel to the duties imposed by federal law.").
89. Id. at 1235 (Watford, J., concurring).
90. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001).
91. See id.; Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1227.
92. Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2839 (2014).
93. See generally In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d
1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 2010); Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc., 405 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied
sub nom. Knisley v. Medtronic, Inc., 546 U.S. 935 (2005).
94. See e.g., Sprint Fidelis, 623 F.3d at 1205 ("The FDA's PMA approval includes
specific language for Class III device labels and warnings. Plaintiffs did not allege that
Medtronic modified or failed to include FDA-approved warnings. Rather, they alleged that, by
reason of state law, Medtronic was required to give additional warnings, precisely the type of
state requirement that is 'different from or in addition to' the federal requirement and therefore
preempted." (citing Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008))); Cupek, 405 F.3d at 424
("Any claim, under state law . . . that Defendant failed to warn patients beyond warnings
required by the FDA, or that Defendant failed to recall a product without first going through the
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Similarly, a negligence per se claim for failing to comply with the
FDA's conditions of approval was deemed to be a "disguised fraud-on-
the-FDA claim" and thereby implicitly preempted under Buckman.9 5
Various circuits have also ruled diametrically on similar state
law allegations of "failure to report." The Fifth and Ninth Circuits
have determined that these claims are different from the
fraud-on-the-FDA theory in Buckman and thus not implicitly
preempted.96 Conversely, the Eighth Circuit reached the same result
as the Sixth Circuit but relied on different reasoning.9 7 The Sixth and
Eighth Circuits' adherence to the defendant-friendly rulings of
Buckman and Riegel is misguided. Riegel "virtually ensure[d] that
medical device manufacturers enjoy legal immunity from injury claims
involving products that have secured premarket approval from the
FDA." 9 8 Such unqualified immunity for manufacturers is improper in
the medical device context; medical devices are inherently risky and
no approval process can guarantee perfect safety.9 9
Similarly, the Court in Buckman implicitly preempted
fraud-on-the-FDA claims; however, the Court's reasoning was based
on policy instead of statute and is not readily applicable to parallel
PMA supplement process would constitute state requirements 'different from' or 'in addition to'
the requirements of the federal PMA application and supplement process.").
95. Cupek, 405 F.3d at 424.
96. See Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1235 (Warford, J., concurring) ("In this case, Medtronic's
failure to report was more than a mere misrepresentation to the FDA because it simultaneously
misled the device's current and potential users, to whom Medtronic owed an independent duty
under state law."). Compare Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 775 (5th Cir. 2011)
("[The plaintiffs] claim is not analogous to the 'fraud-on-the-FDA' theory in Buckman. The
plaintiffs in Buckman were attempting to assert a freestanding federal cause of action based on
violation of the FDA's regulations; the plaintiffs did not assert violation of a state tort duty. In
contrast, [the plaintiff here] is asserting a [state] tort claim based on the underlying state duty to
warn about the dangers or risks of product."), and Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1233 ("The [plaintiffs']
new claim specifically alleges, as a violation of [state] law, a failure to warn the FDA . . . we hold,
under Lohr, Buckman, and Riegel, that this claim is not preempted, either expressly or
impliedly, by the MDA."), with Cupek, 405 F.3d at 423 ("[C]ount IV [alleging Defendant's
'Negligence Per Se' in its 'failure to comply with the FDA's conditions of approval'] was
preempted because it was, in essence, a disguised fraud on the FDA claim.").
97. See In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d
1147, 1160-61 (D. Minn. 2009) ("[Wlhat plaintiffs are ... alleging is that Medtronic violated the
FDCA by failing to inform the FDA in a timely fashion of adverse lead events. Such a claim
necessarily fails, because no private right of action exists under the FDCA . . . Such claims are
impliedly preempted by 21 U.S.C. § 337(a), which states that all proceedings for the enforcement
or to restrain violations of the FDCA 'shall be by and in the name of the United States.' Hence,
'the FDCA leaves no doubt that it is the Federal Government rather than private litigants
[which is] authorized to file suit for noncompliance with the medical device provisions."').
98. Kanodia, supra note 78, at 794.
99. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 337-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
claims based on violations of industry-wide FDA regulations.100 Such
parallel claims differ from fraud-on-the-agency claims in a number of
ways: (1) they can rely on a "traditional state tort" rather than
impermissibly depending on an implied cause of action under federal
statute; (2) they serve a clearer compensatory purpose given their
basis in tort law; and (3) they are more likely to complement the
FDA's enforcement actions without significant risk of disruption.101
These differences would support the Ninth Circuit's ruling against
preemption of parallel state law claims.
The Court in Riegel preempted non-parallel claims to avoid
unfairly burdening medical device manufacturers with "conflicting
requirements based on inexpert determinations of safety and
effectiveness."10 2 Industry-wide FDA regulations such as CGMPs
differ as they allow manufacturers to control the flexibility of their
manufacturing and production procedures.103  Such regulations
provide the opportunity for manufacturers to follow "precise and
detailed manufacturing and production processes" from the outset,
which should reduce the risk of legal liability. 104 In addition, the
danger of parallel claims based on violations of industry-wide
regulations producing fractured interpretations among federal district
courts was addressed and subsequently dismissed by the Seventh
Circuit.10 The Seventh Circuit felt comfortable in relying on the
federal appeals process, among other solutions, which "theoretically
should push questions of federal law toward uniform interpretation
and resolution."10 6
Overall, the reasoning used by the Court in Buckman and
Riegel to protect medical device manufacturers is unnecessary and
harmful to consumers. Circuit courts that continue to rely on it to
preempt parallel state law claims may be encroaching upon a basic
principle of statutory interpretation-courts shall defer to any
expressly manifested intent of Congress.107 While further reducing
100. Elliot S. Tarloff, Medical Devices and Preemption: A Defense of Parallel Claims
Based on Violations of Non-Device Specific FDA Regulations, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1196, 1215
(2011).
101. See id.
102. Id. at 1216-17.
103. Id. at 1217. See also In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig.,
623 F.3d 1200, 1206 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that CGMPs provide "general objectives for all
device manufacturers" and can be applied to all medical devices).
104. Sprint Fidelis, 623 F.3d at 1206.
105. See Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 556 (7th Cir. 2010).
106. Tarloff, supra note 100, at 1217.
107. See Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 175
(2011). ("[W]hen preemption issues are framed for judicial resolution, the Supreme Court has
steadfastly maintained that the inquiry is driven by whether Congress manifested some intent to
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the scope of federal preemption may impede innovation and
development of new devices, it appears "that the major concern of
Congress in enacting the MDA was the protection of public health and
safety from defective and dangerous devices."10 8 Minimizing the scope
of federal preemption and allowing state tort liability to work in
conjunction with the FDA's enforcement scheme to solve medical
device safety issues best serve this concern.109
C. The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits Require Injured
Plaintiffs to Impossibly Plead Violations of Device-Specific
Requirements
The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have required
plaintiffs to plead a violation of a device-specific requirement set forth
in the PMA, rather than a general violation of federal regulations.110
In other words, a state law claim is not "parallel" if the underlying
claim is based on a generalized or industry-wide federal duty that
applies to all medical devices, rather than to a device-specific federal
requirement. In one case, the court held that imposing liability on
manufacturers for violating a general federal requirement would be
akin to enforcing a "heightened standard beyond that of the
FDA-which is impermissible under Riegel.""'
A later case clarified that plaintiffs must set forth facts
pointing to specific violations of PMA requirements.112 Meeting the
requirement involves providing factual details to substantiate the
allegations."3 A clear split exists on the level of specificity required
for the allegedly violated requirement. The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth
displace state law with federal legislation."); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996) ("'The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption case." (quoting
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))).
108. Susan M. Mesner, Medical Device Technology: Does Federal Regulation of This New
Frontier Preempt the Consumer's State Common Law Claims Arising from Injuries Relating to
Defective Medical Devices?, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 253, 294 (1993).
109. See infra Part III.
110. See Walker v. Medtronic, Inc., 670 F.3d 569 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct.
162 (2012); Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int'l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2011); In re Medtronic,
Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010).
111. See Walker, 670 F.3d at 578.
112. Wolicki-Gables, 634 F.3d at 1301 ("Parallel claims must be specifically stated in the
initial pleadings. A plaintiff must allege that '[the] defendant violated a particular federal
specification referring to the device at issue."' (citing Ilarraza v. Medtronic, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d
582, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 2009))).
113. Id. ("Plaintiffs cannot simply incant the magic words '[Appellees] violated FDA
regulations' in order to avoid preemption.... A plaintiff must allege that the defendant violated
a particular federal specification referring to the device at issue.") (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Circuits have held that the MDA does not expressly preempt state law
claims based on alleged violations of federal regulations generally
applicable to all medical devices.114 But the Fourth, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits' demand for plaintiffs to plead violations of device-
specific requirements revives the dilemma of mandating plaintiffs to
include facts in their pleadings that may not be accessible until
discovery. Thus, under a proper application of Twombly and Iqbal,
plaintiffs bringing parallel claims against Class III device
manufacturers face an impossible pleading standard due to the
confidentiality of PMA agreements.115
Courts should relax plaintiffs' pleading burdens in these cases.
This suggestion may appear to contradict Twombly, in which the
Court held that "some threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the
outset before a . .. case should be permitted to go into its inevitably
costly and protracted discovery phase."16 However, allowing these
claims to proceed to discovery is necessary to achieve Congress's
primary goal of ensuring patient safety."' Resolution of the circuit
split by expanding device manufacturer liability and reducing the
scope of federal preemption of parallel state law claims is the first step
in this direction.
D. The Circuit Split Encapsulated
Some courts and scholars have construed Lohr and Riegel
expansively as holding that parallel claims are not preempted under
any form of preemption.118 Under that interpretation, Buckman-a
114. See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2839 (2014) (holding that plaintiffs claims were not preempted despite being based on a general
duty of reasonable care, which is violated by failure to warn the FDA); Hughes v. Boston
Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs claim was not
expressly preempted despite being based on the generally applicable federal requirement to
submit adverse event reports to the FDA); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 554 (7th Cir.
2010) (holding that plaintiffs claims were not expressly preempted despite being based on
alleged CGMP violations).
115. See Norris, supra note 71, at 15.
116. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) ("Rule 8 ... does not
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.").
117. One possible solution is a "sliding scale," where the plaintiffs burden is
"commensurate with the amount of information available . . . ." See Bausch, 630 F.3d at 561. It
has also been suggested that rigid application of Twombly is particularly inappropriate since all
that would be required is "the grant of a request for focused discovery that will involve truly de
minimis costs," which would not infringe upon "concerns for efficient case administration . . . ."
See In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1210 (8th Cir.
2010) (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. See, e.g., Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1228, 1230; Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d
1170, 1181-82 (Cal. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Albertson's Inc. v. Kanter, 555 U.S. 1097 (2009);
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case where a parallel claim was preempted specifically by implied
preemption-would appear to be of limited use or applicability. But
this reading of Lohr and Riegel is incomplete. In Buckman, the
Court cautioned that Lohr "did not . . . address . . . implied
pre-emption. .. ."119 Nor was implied preemption at issue in Riegel.120
Instead, Lohr and Riegel outlined the contours of express preemption,
while Buckman outlined the contours of implied preemption. Only all
three cases, taken together, can provide an accurate view of the
narrow "gap" through which a plaintiffs state-law claim must fit in
order to escape both express and implied preemption.121
The three cases suggest a two-step analysis: (1) the alleged
conduct must violate the FDCA, and (2) the plaintiff must have a
cause of action under state law independent of the FDCA. 122 However,
whether specific claims fall into this gap is the issue underlying the
circuit split that has emerged over the past several years.
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit aligned itself with the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits in concluding that Buckman does not implicitly
preempt state-law claims alleging a failure to report adverse events to
the FDA. 123 These Circuits interpreted Buckman narrowly, finding
that state law causes of action that refer to federal statutes and
regulations as providing the basis for state law liability escape implied
preemption because they remain based in traditional tort law.124 In
essence, these circuits widened the plaintiff-friendly gap between
Riegel and Buckman.
This holding stands in stark contrast to the position taken by
the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, which interpreted Buckman broadly to
mean that a state law claim could survive implied preemption only if
see also Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 514 (5th Cir. 2012) (interpreting Riegel as
"unequivocally" precluding even implied preemption of "parallel" claims).
119. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001).
120. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 345 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting
that respondent "relie[d] exclusively on §360k and [did] not argue [implied] preemption").
121. See Jean M. Eggen, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Preemption of
Medical Device "Parallel Claims," 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 159, 161 (2013) ("[T]he preemption
doctrine has created 'a narrow gap through which a plaintiffs state-law claim must fit if it is to
escape express or implied preemption'-the Scylla and Charybdis of Greek mythology, dual
hazards that few sailors survived." (quoting Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D.
Minn. 2009))).
122. See Sprint Fidelis, 623 F.3d at 1204.
123. See Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1230; Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 775
(5th Cir. 2011); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 556-58 (7th Cir. 2010).
124. See Hughes, 631 F.3d at 775 ("Because [the plaintiff] is asserting a recognized state
tort claim, her claim is comparable to the tort claims in Silkwood and Lohr that Buckman
recognized as surviving implied preemption." (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 481
(1996); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984))); Bausch, 630 F.3d at 558 (holding
that the plaintiffs negligence claims were not implicitly preempted under Buckman because the
plaintiffs were asserting breach of a recognized state-law duty).
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it relied "on traditional state tort law which had predated the federal
enactment in question."125 An equally sharp divide exists regarding
express preemption, with the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
sharply disagreeing with the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
about whether a tort plaintiff may successfully invoke the parallel
claims exception when the federal requirement is a generalized federal
duty, rather than one that is specific to the medical device at issue.
However, a strict application of the Twombly and Iqbal pleading
standards would render most, if not all, plaintiffs' claims unable to
progress past the pleading stage. Given the inherent risk involved
with the continued use of most medical devices, combined with the
Supreme Court's refusal to resolve the circuit split, foreclosing
plaintiffs' options for redress at the pleading stage of lawsuits
essentially blocks all paths to compensation. Instead, a more
reasonable solution is to widen the plaintiff-friendly gap between
Riegel and Buckman even further than the approach taken by the
Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
E. Effects of the Denial of Certiorari to Resolve the Circuit Split
While Stengel most recently addressed the issue of federal
preemption of state law claims, it has been argued that the issue of
preemption can be avoided entirely in that case. Prior to the Supreme
Court denying certiorari to review the en banc decision, the Court
made a rare invitation for the Solicitor General to file a brief on the
issue.126 In his brief, the Solicitor General claimed that the Ninth
Circuit en banc panel had used the wrong reasoning, but that the case
was still not appropriate for Supreme Court review.127 Specifically, he
stated that the plaintiffs' claim was neither expressly preempted by
the MDA's express preemption clause under Riegel, nor implicitly
preempted by the Buckman holding regarding fraud-on-the-FDA
claims.128 Instead, the claim more closely resembled the claim against
125. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001); see Sprint
Fidelis, 623 F.3d at 1205-06.
126. Medtronic, Inc. v. Stengel, 134 S. Ct. 375 (2013).
127. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Medtronic, Inc. v. Stengel, 134 S.
Ct. 375 (2013) (No. 12-1351).
128. See id. at 12 ("[Hlere, respondents attack petitioner's conduct after its device
received premarket approval (and after FDA approved any relevant supplemental application).
That conduct . . . would have been governed not by the terms of the device's premarket approval,
but rather by FDA's general regulations governing adverse-event reporting and labeling revision
in light of new safety information. Accordingly, respondents' failure-to-warn claim-whether
styled as arising from petitioner's failure to make adverse event reports to FDA or from its
failure to make a revision to the device's labeling-is not expressly preempted.").
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a brand-name prescription drug manufacturer that Wyeth v. Levine
held was not implicitly preempted.12 9
The Solicitor General's novel argument departs from the
analytic framework used by all other circuits in medical device
preemption cases since Riegell30 and disagrees with the notion that a
state requirement is saved from express preemption if it parallels a
federal requirement.131 In fact, the Solicitor General trivializes the
circuit split regarding the MDA's preemptive effect as "essentially
academic" and argues that general federal requirements should be
given no preemptive effect at all.13 2 This is premised on the idea that
Section 360k only has preemptive effect when a federal requirement is
device-specific and relevant to the asserted state claim.13 3
However, there does not appear to be a sound legal basis for
distinguishing between general requirements and device-specific
requirements.134 Not only would such a distinction leave injured
plaintiffs without any remedy for a wide range of harmful violations of
federal law, as stated above, but Section 360k explicitly applies
preemption as a defense in cases in which states seek to impose on a
manufacturer "any" requirement.135 The provision does not apply
preemptive effect only to device-specific requirements. Thus, the
Solicitor General's reasoning regarding the Ninth Circuit's apparent
improper interpretation of the preemptive effect of Section 360k and
the emerging circuit split regarding this issue is as anemic as other
circuits' arguments that plaintiffs must plead violations of
device-specific requirements while still meeting the strict pleading
standards of Twombly and Iqbal.
Instead, Stengel directly tackles the issue of federal preemption
and prudently reverses the trend of defendant-friendly rulings
premised on deference to the congressional grant of exclusive FDCA
enforcement authority to the FDA.1 36 The Supreme Court's recent
129. See id. at 7 (referencing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009)).
130. See id. at 15 ("The courts of appeals, in every case since Riegel involving a device
subject to premarket approval, have tacitly dispensed with the first step of a proper Section
360k(a) preemption analysis-i.e., asking whether FDA has established device-specific
requirements on the same subject as the relevant state requirement.").
131. See id. at 17.
132. See id. at 17-18.
133. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) ("[I]n most cases a state law
will be pre-empted only to the extent that the FDA has promulgated a relevant federal
'requirement."').
134. See Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 498 (2011).
135. See id.
136. See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1234 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2839 (2014) (Watford, J., concurring); Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc., 405 F.3d 421, 421 (6th Cir.
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denial of certiorari to resolve the circuit split means that injured
plaintiffs may rely on the en banc decision in Stengel to buttress new
or existing product liability claims.
This is significant because there are currently thousands of
claims, with thousands more unfiled, against some of the nation's
largest manufacturers such as Medtronic. The large number of filed
and unfiled cases exemplifies the inherently risky nature of the
medical device industry and underscores the importance of expanding
manufacturer liability. In addition, if medical device makers cannot
accurately predict the protections they can expect against state law
claims, manufacturers may decide to settle preemptively, which would
reduce the aforementioned legal gridlock.13 7 For example, in May
2014, Medtronic agreed to pay $22 million to settle 950 claims
involving the alleged off-label use of Infuse,138 and the manufacturer
announced plans to hold $120 to $140 million139 in reserve to settle
approximately 3,800 outstanding cases.140
Infuse, in particular, may be the medical device at the heart of
the most prominently affected claims. The FDA approval for Infuse is
specifically for its use in anterior fusion, a particular type of spinal
fusion surgery in which the surgeon approaches the patient's spine
from the front of the abdomen.141 Thus, posterior fusion-in which the
surgeon approaches the patient's spine from the patient's back-is
considered an off-label use of Infuse. For various reasons, the off-label
2005), cert. denied sub nom. Knisley v. Medtronic, Inc., 546 U.S. 935 (2005); In re Medtronic, Inc.,
Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 2010).
137. There have been proposals to create a no-fault compensation scheme in order to
restrict the number of state tort claims that could be filed against medical device manufacturers
while also providing a means to immediately cover harmed patients' costs. See, e.g., David
Chang, Internalizing the External Costs of Medical Device Preemption, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 283
(2013); Amalea Smirniotopoulos, Bad Medicine: Prescription Drugs, Preemption, and the
Potential for a No-Fault Fix, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 793 (2012).
138. See Shezad Malik, Shareholder Class-Action Lawsuit Over Medtronic BMP Infuse
Proceeds, THE LEGAL EXAMINER (Oct. 12, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://fortworth.legalexaminer.com/
defective-dangerous-products/shareholder-class-action-lawsuit-over-medtronic-bmp-infuse-
proceeds/; Press Release, Medtronic, Medtronic Agrees to Settle Certain INFUSE@ Bone Graft
Product Liability Cases (May 6, 2014), available at http://newsroom.medtronic.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=251324&p=irol-newsArticle&id=1927406.
139. It is possible that these amounts may not be considered significant for Medtronic,
which had global revenues of approximately $17 billion over the last fiscal year. See Press
Release, Medtronic, Medtronic Reports Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2014 Earnings (May 20,
2014), available at http://newsroom.medtronic.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=251324&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1932575.
140. Of the 3,800 additional claims stemming from implantation of a Medtronic Infuse
bone graft, only approximately 1,200 have been filed to date. Jane Mundy, Settlement Good News
for Medtronic Infuse Bone Graft Victims, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM (May 13, 2014 8:00
AM), http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/medtronic-infuse-bone-graft/medtronic-
lawsuit-bone-graft-16-19774.html#.VK4De3tChHM.
141. Coleman v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
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use has become increasingly common since Infuse's clinical
introduction and has caused a sharp rise in Infuse-related injuries.
For example, in Coleman v. Medtronic, plaintiffs alleged that
Medtronic violated both state and federal laws by promoting the
off-label use of Infuse while downplaying both the risk of
complications and incidence of adverse events.142 The Supreme Court
recognized in Buckman that off-label use is not illegal or even
disfavored under federal law.143  Instead, it is an accepted and
valuable part of the practice of medicine.144  However, FDA
regulations prohibit a device manufacturer from promoting the use of
a device in a manner inconsistent with the premarket approval.145
Following the rationale of the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits,14 6 the state appellate court in Coleman held that the
doctrines of express preemption and implied preemption did not
preclude the plaintiff from bringing (1) a negligence per se claim based
on Medtronic's alleged violation of a purported federal prohibition on
the promotion of off-label uses,47 and (2) a failure-to-warn claim or a
negligence per se claim based on Medtronic's alleged failure to report
adverse events to the FDA.148  The court dismissed the plaintiffs
failure-to-warn claim based on Medtronic's promotion of off-label
usel49 for failing the McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. genuine equivalence
test.150 However, other district courts have gone even further, relying
on Stengel to hold that off-label promotion takes manufacturers
142. See id. at 305-06.
143. See id. at 307 ("Nothing in the MDA prevents a doctor from using a medical device
in an off-label manner."); see also Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1218 n.3
(W.D. Okla. 2013) ("[Off-label usage of medical devices . . . is an accepted and necessary
corollary of the FDA's mission to regulate in this area without directly interfering with the
practice of medicine." (quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350
(2001))).
144. See Caplinger, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1218 n.3 (quoting Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350).
145. Coleman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307.
146. See id. at 311-12 ("We conclude Stengel III provides the correct framework for
analysis . . . . We believe [the Eighth Circuit's] broad interpretation of Buckman is unwarranted,
as it would preempt almost any state law claim that references a federal requirement, even
though the plaintiff is relying on state law, not federal law, to state a cause of action.").
147. See id. at 316 ("[The plaintiffs] negligence claim is premised on a state requirement
that is parallel to the federal requirement to refrain from off-label marketing.").
148. See id. at 312 ("We agree with [the plaintiff] that the duty to warn should not be so
narrowly defined as to exclude a requirement to file adverse event reports with the FDA ...
construing this duty in that way creates a causation hurdle that plaintiffs would not otherwise
face.").
149. See id. at 313 ("[W]e do not consider the state and federal requirements to be
'genuinely equivalent.' Federal regulations prevent device manufacturers from promoting off-
label use of FDA-approved devices. Those requirements are substantively different than the
requirements imposed by California common law in the failure to warn context.").
150. See McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2005).
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outside the protection of the statutory scheme, including the
protection afforded by preemption, for all state law claims.151
If the Ninth Circuit's decision remains in effect, the ability of
medical device manufacturers to win dismissal of product liability
claims on preemption will be considerably weakened, though not
entirely eliminated.152 Fearful manufacturers could point out that the
Supreme Court, in upholding MDA preemption in Riegel, discerned
from the congressional text that "the solicitude for those injured by
FDA-approved devices ... was overcome in Congress's estimation by
solicitude for those who would suffer without new medical devices if
juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 States to all
innovations."153
Moreover, defining "parallel claims" as broadly as the Fifth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits may have the negative effect of dragging
the FDA into the middle of many lawsuits, thereby bringing about the
interference with agency activities about which Buckman warned.154
The protective shield of federal preemption prevents jurors from
second-guessing the FDA's expert regulatory determinations. It also
ensures that courts and juries do not get entangled in "the difficult
task," assigned by Congress to the FDA, "of regulating the marketing
and distribution of medical devices without intruding upon decisions"
made by medical professionals with respect to beneficial and
widespread off-label uses-decisions that, under Section 396, are
151. See Ramirez v. Medtronic, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 977, 991-92 (D. Ariz. 2013) ("When
the device is not being used in the manner the FDA pre-approved and the manufacturer is
actually promoting such use, there is no law or policy basis on which to pre-empt the application
of state law designed to provide that protection."). It is worth noting that the court in Ramirez
emphasized that the loss of preemptive protection was largely attributable to Medtronic's active
promotion of the off-label use of its device, and not the off-label use itself. See id. at 992 ("[W]hen
the manufacturer has done nothing to . . . promote [the product's] use in an off-label manner, a
claim based only [on] the manufacturer's knowledge of an off-label use appears to be preempted
under § 360k . . .. The shield drops when the manufacturer violates federal law."). The court in
Ramirez also followed the rationale of Stengel in finding the plaintiffs claims were not subject to
implied preemption because they were not "wholly derivative" of federal law, like the claims at
issue in Buckman. See id. at 994. But see Houston v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1178
(C.D. Cal. 2013) ("[A]ny negligence claim based solely on illegal off-label promotion is impliedly
preempted under Buckman. . . .').
152. See, e.g., Pinsonneault v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1011-12 (D.
Minn. 2013) (holding that a state-law duty to warn consumers of the dangers of their products
does not parallel a manufacturer's duty under federal regulations to inform the FDA of adverse
events and dangers pertaining to their devices, as "it is not enough that a duty may be similar to
or consistent with the federal duty to report; rather the duties must be identical or genuinely
equivalent to survive preemption").
153. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008).
154. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (holding that
state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims "inevitably conflict with the FDA's responsibility to police
fraud consistently with the Agency's judgment and objectives" and also "dramatically increase
the burdens" facing companies applying for approval to market new drugs).
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"statutorily committed to the discretion of health care
professionals."5 5
Catherine M. Sharkey-a law professor at New York
University School of Law and one of the nation's leading authorities
on federal preemption-suggests that the issue of encroachment on a
"federal agency's discretionary enforcement prerogative" is at the "new
frontier" in medical device preemption.15 6 However, Professor Sharkey
argues that the solution is more federal agency involvement, not
less.157 She believes that private litigation should not become an
available route for injured plaintiffs to undermine the FDA's reasoned
judgments.s58 But the only way for courts to close off this path is by
soliciting input on the issue of federal preemption of parallel state law
claims from the FDA itself.159 Of course, it is possible that such
agency-court partnerships would impose the very burden the Court in
Buckman feared.60 Professor Sharkey argues that the burden on the
FDA from inquiries in tort suits would be modest at best, and such
burden would be acceptable if a complementary role in liability cases
may bring new risk evidence to the FDA's attention.161
While Professor Sharkey advocates for greater FDA input
when courts decide whether tort claims are "parallel" to federal
requirements, she does not think that Stengel and courts following its
reasoning have substantially expanded what was previously a
narrow-and thus interpretively simple-gap between implied and
express preemption.162  However, courts' recent decisions to deny
dismissal of many state law claims against medical device
manufacturers, with the series of Infuse injury cases involving
Medtronic being a prominent example, would suggest otherwise.163 A
155. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350; see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 835 (1985)
(noting that Congress gave the FDA "complete discretion" to decide how and when to exercise the
wide range of enforcement tools entrusted to it).
156. Catherine M. Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption, 15
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 359, 359 (2014).
157. See id. at 362.
158. Id. at 375.
159. Id.
160. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 351; supra note 154 and accompanying text.
161. See Sharkey, supra note 155, at 382-83.
162. See id. at 386 (describing plaintiffs' hurdle in medical device liability cases as
"'thread[ing] the needle' of a two-sided preemption challenge").
163. A federal district court in Minnesota has allowed a shareholder class-action lawsuit
to proceed against Medtronic regarding Infuse. See Malik, supra note 138. A win by shareholders
in the class-action lawsuit might result in additional actions filed by other patients injured as a
result of surgical procedures involving Infuse. See Jane Mundy, Medtronic Meddling Leads to
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broader gap through which plaintiffs can escape federal preemption
would support greater agency involvement, as Professor Sharkey
argues, to help courts solve more difficult and complex liability cases
that should more frequently progress beyond the pleading stage.164 In
fact, facilitating the progression of plaintiffs' meritorious suits against
device manufacturers past the pleading stage is beneficial as private
litigation brings an inflow of private capital from litigants and results
in important information disclosures through the discovery process.165
These features of private litigation have led many to describe the tort
system as a critical "catalyst" for public enforcement.166 Thus, as
Professor Sharkey implies, state tort law must complement rather
than undermine FDA regulation of medical devices by filling in gaps
in the FDA's regulatory scheme.167 This Note proposes that further
reducing the scope of federal preemption of state law claims advances
this goal.
III. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT BY FURTHER FACILITATING ESCAPE
FROM PREEMPTION
Preemption questions involve fundamental concerns over
procedural justice for tort victims, state regulatory autonomy, and the
optimal size of the federal administrative state.168 A circuit split on
the issue makes it difficult for courts to appropriately weigh these
concerns, while simultaneously affecting the actions of both injured
individuals and device manufacturers.1 69 However, the interests of
both parties are not analogous, and broad preemption of state law
claims is economically inefficient and would provide inadequate
redress for tort victims. Accordingly, the circuit split in question
should be resolved by enlarging the gap between Riegel and Buckman
164. See Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 554, 558 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 498 (2011).
165. Tarloff, supra note 100, at 1225. While the FDA's knowledge of a device's possible
risks is inherently limited because the FDA must rely on the manufacturer itself for the relevant
information, the state tort system, through the discovery process, requires manufacturers to
"disclose everything they know or reasonably should know" regarding the safety and efficacy of
their products. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Deregulatory Effects of Preempting Tort Litigation:
FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 299 JAMA 2313, 2315 (2008).
166. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451 (2005) ("Private remedies
that enforce federal misbranding requirements would seem to aid, rather than hinder,
the functioning of [the statutory regime]. . . . [T]ort suits can serve as a catalyst in this
process . . . .").
167. See generally Smirniotopoulos, supra note 137.
168. Jamelle C. Sharpe, Toward (a) Faithful Agency in the Supreme Court's Preemption
Jurisprudence, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 367, 367 (2011).
169. See supra, Part II.E (providing examples of lower court decisions and party actions
that have been influenced by the widening circuit split).
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through which state law claims can escape express and implied
preemption. Other than cases involving a violation of state law safety
requirements that clearly conflict with federal requirements, all
parallel state law claims should escape preemption at the pleading
stage so that plaintiffs can gain access to discovery.
A. Reasons against Immunizing Manufacturers from State Law
Claims
Courts' decisions to preempt state law claims involve
consideration of regulatory efficiency and corrective justice.170
Regulatory efficiency considerations involve determining: (1) whether
it is ultimately more favorable to potential tort victims to preempt
state law claims; or (2) whether the distributional effects, both positive
and negative, of the preemption decision on various demographic or
interest groups advance or impede predefined policy goals.171
Similarly, corrective justice considerations examine whether the state
remedial laws under which individuals, entities, or interest groups
could obtain redress for private wrongs would be eliminated to serve
some overriding federal purpose.172 The assumption is that Congress
would not intend to preempt state law claims if doing so would create
a "remedial vacuum" unless there is a clear statement to the
contrary.173 In the device landscape created by the circuit split, the
best solution with these two preemption factors in mind is reducing
the immunization from state law claims enjoyed by manufacturers.
The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have already moved in this
direction,174 and courts must push further forward.
Preempting claims against manufacturers has been likened to
allowing manufacturers to 'externalize the harms produced by their
170. See Sharpe, supra note 106, at 177-78.
171. See id. at 177; Sharpe, supra note 167, at 377.
172. See Sharpe, supra note 107, at 177; Sharpe, supra note 168, at 375-76 ("[Corrective
justice] frequently manifests itself in arguments about whether Congress would intentionally
preempt state tort laws without also providing allegedly injured parties an alternative means of
redress.").
173. See Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 617 (1997); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 337
(2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The MDA's failure to create any federal compensatory remedy
for such consumers further suggests that Congress did not intend broadly to preempt state
common-law suits . . . . It is 'difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove
all means of judicial recourse' for large numbers of consumers injured by defective medical
devices." (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984))).
174. See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2839 (2014); Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011); Bausch v. Stryker
Corp., 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 498 (2011).
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devices to the government and public.175  This is harmful, as
externalities borne by those that did not produce them distort the true
costs and use of resources.'76  In the medical device context,
permitting medical device manufacturers to externalize harms fosters
poor corporate behavior and does not compel companies to act swiftly
and appropriately when their products harm consumers.77  In
essence, broad preemption removes any economic incentive for
manufacturers to be principled corporate citizens because they do not
suffer any consequences if they fail to act in a responsible manner."8
Instead, manufacturers should bear the costs; internalization of
externalities is tort law's way of preventing or deterring harmful
actions.79 As a specific example, the Eighth Circuit's finding of broad
preemption of state law claims180 externalized the costs of the injuries
to Medicare.181 Estimates indicate that this directly resulted in
Medicare paying up to one billion dollars in additional claims.182 Had
Medtronic been forced to internalize the potential costs of its product's
defects in that case, Medtronic would have been compelled to act much
more quickly to address the problem, saving hundreds of millions of
dollars and preventing thousands of unnecessary injuries.183
Externalizing the costs of defective devices onto the government, and
ultimately the tort victims themselves, is a clear example of economic
inefficiency.
Preemption is also harmful to tort victims, as state law tort
suits can uncover unknown hazards associated with medical devices
and incentivize manufacturers to divulge safety risks promptly.184
This is especially true given the large number of medical devices that
receive approval under the significantly less stringent 510(k)
process.'85 Manufacturers have much greater access to information
175. See Chang, supra note 137, at 299.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 300.
178. See id.
179. Israel Gilead, Tort Law and Internalization: The Gap Between Private Loss and
Social Cost, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 589, 589 (1997).
180. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1203
(8th Cir. 2010).
181. H. DENNIS TOLLEY, EXAMINING THE SPRINT FIDELIs EFFECT ON MEDICARE COSTS 2
(2010), available at http://www.rheingoldlaw.com/blog/2010-4-7_Tolley%2OReportFinal.pdf.
182. Id.
183. Chang, supra note 137, at 304.
184. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 579 (2009).
185. FDA approval, no matter how rigorous or extensive, does not give blanket immunity
to manufacturers from liability for injuries caused by faulty or excessively risky devices. Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 337-38 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("FDA regulation of a
device cannot anticipate and protect against all safety risks to individual consumers. Even the
most thorough regulation of a product such as a critical medical device may fail to identify
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about their products, particularly in the post-marketing phase as new
risks emerge.1 86
In addition, recent history suggests that the FDA does not have
adequate time, capacity, or resources to monitor manufacturers to
ensure that their post-market conduct complies with safety
requirements; to perform the necessary cost-benefit analysis to
determine when enforcement actions are appropriate; or to pursue
legal actions against manufacturers when doing so would be
efficient.87 The FDA's limited resources exacerbate the problem,
despite an ever-growing mission of regulating and protecting the
public from an increasing number of medical devices.8 8 Parallel
claims based on violations of the FDA's industry-wide regulations can
complement the FDA's efforts in all of these endeavors. In particular,
tort litigation "can help uncover previously unavailable data on
adverse effects, questionable practices by manufacturers, and flaws in
regulatory systems."189 Moreover, increased accountability under
state tort law deters risky device designs and encourages continued
research and testing of devices on the market.
Some have argued that tort law may in fact over-deter
manufacturers by dissuading them from developing beneficial
devices.9 0  Because tort claims focus on the harm suffered by a
particular patient, rather than the benefits received by others, they
may not produce efficient results.191  Tort law also cannot help
patients who are denied access to a valuable medical device due to
such over-deterrence.192 However, while tort law does not provide a
perfect regulatory system, it is a necessary supplement to the equally
imperfect oversight by the FDA.1 93 As it currently stands, the FDA
cannot adequately identify the risks associated with devices before
they are on the market, nor can it effectively monitor and regulate
potential problems presented by the product. Regulation cannot protect against all possible
injuries that might result from use of a device over time. Preemption of all such claims would
result in the loss of a significant layer of consumer protection.").
186. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 578-79.
187. Tarloff, supra note 100, at 1224.
188. See INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 193 (2007), available at
http://www.nap.edulopenbook.php?record-id=11750&page=193 ("The [FDA] lacks the resources
needed to accomplish its large and complex mission today, let alone to position itself for an
increasingly challenging future.").
189. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug
Risks, 297 JAMA 308, 308 (2007).
190. Smirniotopoulos, supra note 137, at 818.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 819.
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those products once they are in widespread use.194 Accordingly, the
most efficient regulatory regime is one that provides deterrence,
corrective compensation, and incentives for manufacturers to disclose
pre- and post-market safety information by creating the threat of
substantial monetary damages and reputational costs in cases of
non-compliance or misconduct.195 Such a regime must entail a greater
threat of litigation against manufacturers as a significant complement
to continued agency oversight.
B. Reducing Preemption and Increasing Tort Liability
Imposing liability for meritorious parallel state law claims
serves a clear compensatory function and complements, rather than
interferes with, the FDA's monitoring actions and enforcement
decisions.196 Like Steven McCormick, many medical device users
suffer chronic and debilitating pain, injuries, and even death through
no fault of their own. Such victims often incur huge financial losses
because manufacturers negligently manufactured products and failed
to report malfunctioning devices. The state law tort system may be
needed to make such victims whole.197 That the manufacturers'
tortious conduct also violates federal and state laws reinforces the
argument that injured consumers deserve an opportunity for
corrective justice and their right to seek compensation.198 Parallel
claims, in particular, are based on a traditional duty of care arising
under state law. The most damning part of such claims is that the
manufacturer failed to satisfy its obligation to its consumers-as
opposed to its obligation to a federal agency-and, as such, falls under
the purview of a traditional state law theory of liability. 199
Without further expanding the no-preemption gap, some
injured plaintiffs may still be denied compensation because their tort
suits are blocked and because the FDA is not empowered to ensure
that injured victims of improperly manufactured devices receive
194. In fact, we may be "substantially dependent on the tort system to provide the
educational function of revealing massive cover-ups of health information . . . or occasional
efforts to conceal risk information from regulatory agencies like the FDA . Robert Rabin,
Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2069 (2000).
195. See Smirniotopoulos, supra note 137, at 814.
196. See Tarloff, supra note 100, at 1220.
197. See id. at 1222.
198. For a discussion of the various roles that the tort system can play as well as a
delineation and defense of the compensatory function of tort law, see generally Mark A.
Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort Liability, 121
YALE L.J. 142 (2011); Mark A. Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort
Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 585 (2003).
199. See Tarloff, supra note 100, at 1223.
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damages. In addition, plaintiffs' claims based on violations of
non-device-specific regulations that should survive preemption fall
within the traditional domains of state authority to provide
compensation for injured citizens and to promote public health and
safety.2 00 Moreover, the advantages of the state law tort system and
the dangers associated with medical devices have spurred many
members of Congress to push for a uniform standard of no preemption
for premarket-approved devices.201 Thus, a move towards decreased
preemption and increased tort liability fulfills tort law's natural
compensatory function and ensures effective deterrence without
federal encroachment on a traditional area of state law authority.202
IV. CONCLUSION
A circuit split encompassing both the circumstances under
which the MDA implicitly preempts state law claims and the scope of
the MDA's express preemption provision has deepened over the past
several years. This circuit split is reshaping the medical device
litigation landscape, and device manufacturers have changed their
approach to tackle the large number of impending lawsuits in light of
federal circuit court decisions ruling against federal preemption of
so-called "parallel" state law claims. While agency regulation of
medical devices was previously adequate to ensure consumer safety,
the inevitable increase in mobile healthcare and consumer access,
among other considerations, requires supplementation to the
regulatory scheme.203 Thus, the circuit split should be resolved by
condensing the scope of federal preemption and further increasing
liability for manufacturers to an unprecedented scale such that the
200. See id. at 1230.
201. Lisa M. Mottes, The Need for Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims in the Context
of "New Drugs" and Premarket-Approved Medical Devices, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 723, 725
(2011).
202. See generally Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 54-62 (2002)
(discussing the benefits of allowing private parties to assist in regulation via litigation,
emphasizing their advantages in detection and gathering information). Note that the FDA alone
may not do an adequate job deterring dangerous behavior by device manufacturers, since the
FDA, like all agencies, is subject to capture by the industries that it regulates. See
Smirniotopoulos, supra note 137, at 808-09 (stating that the FDA is particularly vulnerable to
manufacturer influence and agency capture, which can hinder effective regulatory decision-
making by biasing the agency toward decisions that benefit manufacturers). "Capture, in turn,
leads to lax regulations and weak enforcement by an agency." Norris, supra note 71, at 16.
203. In particular, mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets have provided a new
medium for medical devices-one that provides direct consumer access to medical tools-and
technology is threatening to outpace the regulatory environment. See Vincent J. Roth, The
mHealth Conundrum: Smartphones & Mobile Medical Apps-How Much FDA Medical Device
Regulation is Required?, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 359, 361 (2014).
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state law tort regime substantially supplements agency enforcement.
This would fulfill state tort law's natural compensatory function and
efficiently fill in any gaps in the overall regulatory scheme.
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